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CARDOZO ON THE SUPREME COURT:   
MEETING HIGH EXPECTATIONS 
Richard D. Friedman* 
 
INTRODUCTION 
President Trump announced his nomination of Neil Gorsuch—
the sixth most senior judge on a federal appellate court in the 
hinterland—for a seat on the Supreme Court in a formal, nationally 
televised ceremony.  Judge Gorsuch squeezed the shoulder of his wife, 
a gesture that signaled not only his thrill at the nomination but his joy 
at being able to share it with her.  There followed a bitterly partisan 
process, featuring hearings at which the nominee testified and 
deflected questions about his substantive views.  A change in the 
Senate rules, ending the possibility of a filibuster, was necessary to 
bring the nomination to a vote.  That change was adopted by a virtual 
party line-vote, and then Judge Gorsuch was confirmed by a similar 
vote. 
Now compare the nomination of Benjamin Cardozo in 1932.  
Cardozo was the chief judge of the New York Court of Appeals, the 
highest court in the largest and most important state in the nation, at a 
time when (as John Goldberg has pointed out) state courts occupied a 
greater position in the national consciousness than they do now.1  He 
was the most revered and probably best known judge in the nation not 
on the Supreme Court.  When Justice Holmes retired, and interest 
immediately centered on Cardozo, he insisted privately that he wished 
not to be asked and that he did not believe he ought to accept the 
nomination if it were offered.2  But in fact he resolved that if asked he 
 
* Alene and Allan F. Smith Professor of Law, University of Michigan School of Law. 
1 See John C. P. Goldberg, Benjamin Cardozo and the Death of the Common Law, 34 
TOURO L. REV. 147, 153 (2018). 
2 ANDREW L. KAUFMAN, CARDOZO 469 (1998). 
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would accept—as he put it a few months later, “as one must accept 
sickness or death.”3  And so, when the offer came, by telephone, he 
accepted immediately.  The White House announced without fanfare 
or elaboration that the President had sent Cardozo’s name to the 
Senate.4  The nomination was received with nearly universal acclaim.  
As was the practice in those days, the hearing was quick and the 
nominee did not testify.  Confirmation was unanimous, without need 
for a roll-call vote.  Do not bet on that happening any time in the near 
future! 
Though the nomination doubtless appealed to Cardozo’s 
vanity, his pleasure was considerably muted, because the woman who 
was his life partner, his sister Nellie, had died a little more than two 
years earlier; Cardozo described the loss as “[i]rreparable,”5 and said, 
“I ask myself in wonderment why I should value [praise], now that the 
one who would have shared it with me so fully has gone from me for 
ever.”6 
Indeed, Cardozo appears to have been suffering a mild form of 
depression during his tenure on the Supreme Court; he sometimes 
expressed a wish he were dead.7  He was also in vulnerable physical 
condition, with a heart that was already significantly weakened by the 
time he took his seat.8  He was in a strange city, far removed from his 
friends in New York and Albany, and dealing for the most part with an 
entirely new body of law, one that he enjoyed less than the docket of 
his old court.9  For all but the last few months of his active tenure, he 
was the junior justice on the Court; that mattered, in large part because 
he was unlikely to get too many choice assignments.10  And the Court 
was run by a Chief Justice whose style, in driving prompt decision-
making, was very different from the slower, more deliberative process 
that Cardozo favored and to which he had become accustomed. 
 
3 Id. 
4 Cardozo is Named to Supreme Court; Nomination Hailed, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 16, 1932. 
5 KAUFMAN, supra note 2, at 196. 
6 KAUFMAN, supra note 2, at 195. 
7 KAUFMAN, supra note 2, at 475. 
8 KAUFMAN, supra note 2, at 195, 476. 
9 Interview with Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., in Washington, D.C. (Aug. 17, 1976). 
10 At one point, Felix Frankfurter, then a professor at Harvard, asked his former student, 
Joseph L. Rauh, Jr., who was clerking for Cardozo, “Joe, when will that swine Hughes stop 
giving Cardozo all the bad opinions?”  Id.  Decades later, Rauh remembered with certainty the 
porcine reference.  Id. 
2
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And yet, for all that, Cardozo had what was probably the 
greatest short tenure in the Court’s history.  I believe several factors 
help account for this fact. 
Timing  
Cardozo’s timing was impeccable.  He took his seat on March 
14, 1932, near the low moment of the Great Depression, and less than 
a year before the beginning of the New Deal.  His active tenure ended 
in December of the crisis year of 1937.  Earlier in that year, the Court 
had issued an important set of decisions that helped set the framework 
of modern constitutional law,11 and even more recently the Senate had 
defeated Franklin D. Roosevelt’s Court-packing plan.  FDR’s 
appointment of Hugo Black to replace Willis Van Devanter 
consolidated the trend of decisions and ensured that the conservative 
bloc would not control results for the foreseeable future.  One would 
be hard-pressed to pick another 5½ year period in which a single justice 
could make so much of a difference. 
The Right Side of History 
At times, feeling his limited power as the junior justice, 
Cardozo consoled himself by saying that at least his votes mattered.12  
And they certainly did, for the Supreme Court not only was deciding 
matters of intense public interest, but it was closely divided on many 
of them.  One issue above all was salient during Cardozo’s tenure on 
the Supreme Court—the scope of governmental power, both state and 
federal, to achieve economic ends.  The conservative foursome on the 
Court13 were likely to regard some governmental regulations as undue 
 
11 The most prominent of the decisions in the spring of 1937 were W. Coast Hotel Co. v. 
Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding a minimum wage law for women; 5-4 decision); 
NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937) (upholding the National Labor 
Relations Act; 5-4 decision); Charles C. Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548 (1937) 
(upholding, per opinion by Cardozo, unemployment compensation provisions of Social 
Security Act of 1935; 5-4 decision); and Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S. 619 (1937) (upholding, 
per opinion by Cardozo, provisions of Social Security Act for old-age benefits; 7-2 decision).  
I characterize the decisions as “important,” which they unquestionably were, rather than 
“revolutionary,” because I believe the latter term is wrong, or at least potentially misleading.  
See generally Richard D. Friedman, Switching Time and Other Thought Experiments: The 
Hughes Court and Constitutional Transformation, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1891 (1994). 
12 See KAUFMAN, supra note 2, at 493. 
13 The so-called Four Horsemen were Justices Willis Van Devanter, James C. McReynolds, 
George Sutherland, and Pierce Butler. 
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interferences with the free market and at times confiscatory, to try to 
impose limits on the power of taxation, and to try to confine federal 
power over interstate commerce within tight, categorical bounds.14  
Cardozo, along with Louis Brandeis and Harlan Stone, was one of 
three justices who consistently opposed them; if, but only if, they were 
joined both by Chief Justice Charles Evans Hughes and Owen J. 
Roberts, they would prevail.  The pattern played out in one important 
decision after another15—even before the great decisions of 1937, all 
 
14 Of course, the four also regarded many regulations and taxes as valid.  See generally 
Barry Cushman, The Secret Lives of the Four Horsemen, 83 VA. L. REV. 559 (1997).  But they 
were significantly less likely to do so than were their colleagues. 
15 Major pre-1937 cases in which Cardozo helped form a 5-4 majority on the liberal side 
were Home Bldg. & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934) (joining in Hughes’s 
opinion, for a 5-4 Court, upholding a mortgage moratorium law); Nebbia v. New York, 291 
U.S. 502 (1934) (joining in Roberts’s opinion, for a 5-4 Court, upholding a state regulation of 
milk prices and making clear “that there is no closed class or category of businesses affected 
with a public interest” and so subject to price regulation); The Gold Clause Cases (comprising 
a set of four decisions, Norman v. Baltimore & Ohio R.R. and United States v. Bankers’ Tr. 
Co., 294 U.S. 240 (1935); Nortz v. United States, 294 U.S. 317 (1935); and Perry v. United 
States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935), each decided 5-4, declining to give effect to contractual clauses 
that would have undermined federal decision to detach dollar from the value of gold); 
Ashwander v. Tenn. Valley Auth., 297 U.S. 288 (1936) (joining with Stone and Roberts in 
Brandeis’s concurrence, expressing agreement with Hughes’s majority opinion that the TVA 
acted validly in selling power generated by a dam, the building of which was justified on 
grounds of federal defense, but expressing the view that the Court should have followed a 
policy of avoiding constitutional issues, especially ones involving Congressional power, when 
possible). 
  Among the most significant pre-1937 cases in which Cardozo dissented from the liberal 
side were Louis K. Liggett Co. v. Lee, 288 U.S. 517 (1933) (dissenting, in an opinion joined 
by Stone, with Brandeis writing a separate dissent, from an opinion invalidating a statute that 
imposed heavier license fees on chain stores located in more than one county; asserting that 
“[t]he graduation of a tax upon the business of a chain store may be regulated by the test of 
territorial expansion, and territorial expansion may be determined by the spread of business 
from one county into another.”); Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 289 U.S. 627 (1933) 
(joining, with Hughes and Brandeis, in an opinion by Stone dissenting from a holding that 
severely restricted the power of the Interstate Commerce Commission to protect local ports 
against discrimination by carriers); Pan. Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) (dissenting 
alone from holding that statute purporting to give President power to ban shipment of “hot oil” 
in interstate commerce was an excessive delegation); R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Alton R.R. Co., 295 
U.S. 330 (1935) (joining, with the other liberals, in an opinion by Hughes dissenting from a 
decision invalidating key provisions of the Railroad Retirement Act on Commerce Clause and 
Due Process grounds); United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1 (1936) (joining, along with 
Brandeis, in Stone’s dissent from opinion by Roberts invalidating a portion of the Agricultural 
Adjustment Act of 1933 as an inappropriate use of the taxing power to achieve economic 
coercion); Carter v. Carter Coal Co., 298 U.S. 238 (1936) (dissenting, in an opinion joined by 
the other liberals, with Hughes writing a partial dissent, from an opinion by Sutherland 
invalidating the Bituminous Coal Conservation Act of 1935; concluding that the marketing 
provisions of the Act were valid, and that therefore there was no need to determine whether 
the labor provisions were as well); Ashton v. Cameron Cty. Water Improvement Dist. No. 1, 
4
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but one of which were decided 5-4, over the votes of all four 
conservatives.16 
It is easy enough to say from the perspective of eighty years 
that there are some areas in which the Court fell short, but I think it 
would be hard to come up with many decisions, major or minor, in 
which any other member of the Court appears from the modern 
perspective to have taken a more appealing position than the one that 
Cardozo did. 
Self-assurance 
Cardozo’s votes mattered, but while he was on the Court he 
also mattered in other ways and for other reasons.  One important 
factor was a matter of personality, probably accentuated by long 
experience as a highly esteemed judge, and chief, of the most visible 
court in the nation apart from the Supreme Court.  Cardozo had great 
self-assurance, which went along with a plentiful dose of guts and 
vanity.  He knew his ability.  Being the junior justice did not dissuade 
him at all from making his presence felt.  
This quality is nicely illustrated by a story told to me years ago 
by Charles E. Wyzanski, Jr., who had been a young New Deal lawyer 
and later became a celebrated federal judge.  Wyzanski argued a case 
of little significance, Zimmern v. United States,17 for the government.  
His case fell apart at argument, and Cardozo wrote a brief opinion, 
reversing for a unanimous Court.18  Some time later, Wyzanski visited 
Cardozo for tea, and the justice said, “I never thought that case was 
worthy of an argument by you or an opinion by me.”19 
 
298 U.S. 513 (1936) (dissenting, joined by the other liberals and Hughes, from McReynolds 
opinion invalidating a federal statute extending bankruptcy protection, albeit with consent of 
state, to subdivisions of a state); Morehead v. New York ex rel. Tipaldo, 298 U.S. 587 (1936) 
(joining, along with the other liberals, in dissent by Hughes from a decision invalidating a 
minimum wage law, and also joining, along with Brandeis, in Stone’s dissent, which favored 
the overruling of precedent on which majority opinion relied).  See also A.L.A. Schechter 
Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (writing a separate concurrence, joined 
by Stone, agreeing that a regulation was invalid on both Commerce Clause and delegation 
grounds, but taking a more flexible view on both than did Hughes’s majority opinion). 
16 See supra note 11. 
17 298 U.S. 167 (1936). 
18 See generally id. 
19 See Richard D. Friedman, Cardozo the [Small r] realist, 98 MICH. L. REV. 1738, 1749 
(2000).  Judge Wyzanski told me the story during an interview at his house in Cambridge, 
Mass., May 28, 1975. 
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Cardozo’s first opinion on the Court, in a case argued one week 
after he took his seat, was a dissent.20  That had not been true of any 
justice since before the time of John Marshall, who ended the prior 
practice in which the justices often issued seriatim opinions; this was 
indeed the first time since the Marshall era that a new justice’s opinion 
was anything but an opinion for the court.21  Cardozo’s first opinion 
drew heavily on his common law knowledge, but he cited almost all 
federal cases; he came to the Court ready to do the job, and not afraid 
to speak out. 
Thus, in one of the first cases to consider New Deal legislation, 
Panama Refining Co. v. Ryan,22 Cardozo dissented alone from the 
Court’s decision that a provision of the National Industrial Recovery 
Act delegated power to the President with insufficient guidance.23  
Chief Justice Hughes, a commanding figure who had known Cardozo 
since Hughes was a young law school graduate and Cardozo was a 14-
year-old boy in knickerbockers,24 wrote the majority opinion,25 on an 
issue about which he cared deeply.  The junior justice was not silenced.  
And, as discussed below, I think he got the better of the debate. 
Delegation arose again later the same year in A.L.A. Schechter 
Poultry Corp. v. United States,26 the famous “Sick Chicken” case.  The 
case was a broad assault on the President’s code-making authority 
under the same Act—an authority associated with the famous symbol 
of the Blue Eagle and probably the most expansive program of early 
New Deal legislation.27  The Court, again per Hughes, unanimously 
held the authority unconstitutional, both on delegation grounds and as 
beyond Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause.28  This time, 
Cardozo agreed.29  Concurring opinions were not nearly as common in 
the Hughes Court as they are now; most often, justices in the majority 
swallowed doubts they had concerning the precise articulation of 
 
20 Coombes v. Getz, 285 U.S. 434, 448-52 (1932) (Cardozo, J., dissenting, joined by 
Brandeis & Stone, JJ.). 
21 Friedman, supra note 19, at 1749 nn.47-48.  Marshall tended to hog the big opinions, and 
so two justices during his time as Chief issued concurrences as their first opinions.  Friedman, 
supra note 19, at 1749 n.48. 
22 293 U.S. 388 (1935).  
23 Id. at 433-48 (Cardozo, J., dissenting). 
24 1 MERLO J. PUSEY, CHARLES EVANS HUGHES 74 (1951). 
25 See generally Pan. Ref., 293 U.S. at 388. 
26 295 U.S. 495 (1935). 
27 See generally id. 
28 Id. at 551. 
29 See id. at 551, 554 (Cardozo, J., concurring). 
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standards made in the majority opinion.  Cardozo did not do so.  He 
concurred in an opinion, joined by Stone, that agreed with the Court 
on both points but took a softer line on both.30  Ultimately, on both, the 
law moved in his direction (and beyond). 
In other cases, Cardozo spoke up, and with substantial effect, 
but only in private, without ultimately publishing an opinion.  
According to Andrew Kaufman, it was Cardozo’s threat to publish a 
dissent from a grant of certiorari that led the Court to stop taking cases 
to review verdicts won by injured railroad workers.31  And in at least 
three notable cases the historical record reveals Cardozo’s behind-the-
scenes impact.  In Home Building & Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell,32 which 
upheld, by a 5-4 vote, Minnesota’s mortgage moratorium law,33 
Cardozo found Hughes’s draft opinion rather bloodless.  He drafted a 
concurrence that was, as Kaufman has written, “a forceful and candid 
justification for reinterpreting constitutional provisions in light of their 
purposes and in light of changing conditions of society.”34  Hughes 
added a passage to his draft incorporating much of the substance of 
Cardozo’s, and Cardozo then withdrew his.35  In Grosjean v. American 
Press Co.,36 a draft opinion by Cardozo had an even more dramatic 
impact.  The case involved a challenge to a statute of Huey Long’s 
Louisiana that taxed the advertising receipts of newspapers and other 
periodicals.  Justice Sutherland drafted an opinion for the Court that 
would have held the tax invalid as a denial of equal protection because 
it made the size of the tax depend on the publication’s circulation.  
Finding this basis unpersuasive, Cardozo drafted an opinion 
concluding that, because the tax discriminated against newspapers in 
favor of other forms of business, it violated the freedom of the press.  
 
30 Id. at 551-55. 
31 KAUFMAN, supra note 2, at 479. 
32 290 U.S. 398 (1934). 
33 Id. at 448. 
34 KAUFMAN, supra note 2, at 502. 
35 KAUFMAN, supra note 2, at 500-02.  Cardozo’s draft, portions of which are published in 
PAUL BREST ET AL., PROCESSES OF CONSTITUTIONAL DECISIONMAKING: CASES AND MATERIALS 
571-72 (6th ed. 2015), spoke of the state “furthering its own good by maintaining the economic 
structure on which the good of all depends.”  Id. at 572.  This emphasis on the importance of 
growing social interaction was not new for him.  See BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, Introduction. 
The Method of Philosophy, in THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 9, 24 (1921) (speaking 
of “the growing complexity of social relations” as having revealed the inadequacy of the earlier 
rule “that A. may conduct his business as he pleases, even though the purpose is to cause loss 
to B., unless the act involves the creation of a nuisance”).  The unpublished Blaisdell opinion 
is discussed further below.  See infra notes 91-95 and accompanying text. 
36 297 U.S. 233 (1936). 
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Evidently Sutherland, and the Court, were persuaded; the ultimate 
opinion adopted a rationale much like Cardozo’s.37  And in Railroad 
Retirement Board v. Alton Railroad Co.,38 Cardozo helped Hughes 
make his fine dissent more persuasive.  In that case, the Court held 
unconstitutional a federal statute requiring railroads subject to the 
Interstate Commerce Act to establish retirement and pension plans.39  
In a letter, Cardozo suggested that Hughes make the analogy between 
a pension law and workmen’s compensation laws.40  “What is the 
distinction,” he asked, “between compensating men who have been 
incapacitated by accident (though without fault of the employer), and 
compensating men who have been injured by the wear and tear of time, 
the slow attrition of the years?”41  Hughes took the point and adopted 
much of Cardozo’s language.42 
It bears emphasis that Cardozo was the junior justice 
throughout this time.  Compare the action of Owen Roberts, the next 
most junior justice.  At the critical moment in 1936 when the Court 
invalidated New York’s minimum wage law,43 Roberts went along 
with the majority; he failed to write separately, despite the fact that the 
majority opinion adopted a position that he must have found appalling, 
and apparently he even failed to state his mind clearly in conference.44  
One cannot easily imagine Cardozo acting like that. 
Judicial Modesty and the Nature of Law and Legal 
Change 
Cardozo’s personal self-assurance while on the Supreme Court 
ran alongside a trait that might be called judicial modesty.  Three 
tendencies stand out as part of this trait: deference to the political 
branches, avoidance of unnecessary issues, and favoring open-textured 
standards and incremental changes over broad, categorical 
pronouncements.    
 
37 KAUFMAN, supra note 2, at 539-41. 
38 295 U.S. 330 (1935). 
39 Id. at 360. 
40 KAUFMAN, supra note 2, at 519-20 (citations omitted). 
41 KAUFMAN, supra note 2, at 520. 
42 See R.R. Ret. Bd., 295 U.S. at 384. 
43 Morehead, 298 U.S. at 587. 
44 Richard D. Friedman, Taking Decisions Seriously, 24 J. SUP. CT. HIST. 314, 320-21 
(1999) (reviewing BARRY CUSHMAN, RETHINKING THE NEW DEAL COURT: THE STRUCTURE OF 
A CONSTITUTIONAL REVOLUTION (1998)). 
8
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Deference 
Many of Cardozo’s great decisions on the New York Court of 
Appeals concerned the extent to which courts—most frequently, trial 
courts—should defer to jurors.  Whether Cardozo showed an 
appropriate amount of deference to the jury is a matter of debate.45  But 
when he reached the Supreme Court, the proper role of the jury receded 
in importance.  The great issue dominating the Court during Cardozo’s 
time was the extent to which courts—most importantly, the Supreme 
Court itself—should defer to choices made by the political organs of 
government.  And in this context, Cardozo was highly deferential, not 
only to legislators46 but also to administrators.47  That differential in 
attitude, assuming it existed, may be attributable in large part to elitism 
on Cardozo’s part; jurors did not have the stature of a coordinate 
branch of government. 
And indeed, Cardozo regarded government as a largely 
cooperative enterprise.  His opinion in Charles C. Steward Machine 
Co. v. Davis,48 one of the Social Security cases and so one of the few 
plum assignments he received from Hughes, is a good example.  The 
Social Security Act imposed a payroll tax on employers but allowed a 
credit of 90% to employers for contributions to unemployment funds 
established under state law that complied with standards established 
by the Act.49  The taxpayer objected that this program coerced the 
states into enacting federally-prescribed programs.50  Cardozo, for a 5-
4 majority, responded: 
 
45 The matter was indeed debated at the 2017 Touro conference on Cardozo, of which this 
paper was a part. 
46 See supra note 11. 
47 See, e.g., Jones v. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, 298 U.S. 1 (1936).  In that case, the SEC began 
an investigation of a securities registration statement before it became effective.  Id. at 661.  
The issuer then attempted to withdraw the statement, but the SEC refused to allow withdrawal 
and continued its investigation.  Id.  The Supreme Court, by a 6-3 vote, held this improper. 
Cardozo, joined by Brandeis and Stone, dissented.  See id. at 663-65 (Cardozo, J., dissenting).  
Cardozo emphasized that the Commission had “plenary authority . . . to conduct all 
investigations believed to be necessary and proper for the enforcement of the act and of any 
of its provisions.”  Id. at 664 (Cardozo, J., dissenting).  And, he said, “[t]here will be only 
partial attainment of the ends of public justice unless retribution for the past is added to 
prevention for the future.”  Id. 
48 301 U.S. 548 (1937).  
49 Charles C. Steward, 301 U.S. at 586.   
50 Id. 
9
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Who . . . is coerced through the operation of this 
statute? . . . Not the state. Even now she does not offer 
a suggestion that in passing the unemployment law she 
was affected by duress. . . . For all that appears, she is 
satisfied with her choice, and would be sorely 
disappointed if it were now to be annulled.51 
Another example is Ashton v. Cameron County Water Improvement 
District No. 1,52 in which the majority—the conservative four plus 
Roberts—invalidated a federal statute that allowed a political 
subdivision of the state to secure bankruptcy protection.53  Cardozo, 
writing for the four dissenters, found the majority’s conclusion 
baffling.  Acknowledging that there might be a serious problem if the 
state’s consent were not necessary, he wrote that the statute was in fact 
“framed with sedulous regard to the structure of the federal system,” 
and that it would “maintain the equilibrium between state and national 
power.”54  And, he said, to hold that the protective purpose of the 
statute “must be thwarted by the courts because of a supposed affront 
to the dignity of a state, though the state disclaims the affront and is 
doing all it can to keep the law alive, is to make dignity a doubtful 
blessing.”55  Also reflecting a sense of a cooperative form of 
government, in this context between legislature and executive, were 
Cardozo’s views on delegation; as discussed below, they were more 
receptive than those of any other justice. 
Avoidance 
Cardozo tended, where possible, to avoid definitive 
pronouncement on doubtful issues.  This approach is most often 
associated with Brandeis’s concurring opinion in Ashwander v. 
Tennessee Valley Authority,56 which Cardozo joined, along with Stone 
and Roberts.57  One notable opinion by Cardozo exemplifying it was 
 
51 Id. at 589 (internal citations omitted). 
52 298 U.S. 513 (1936).  
53 Id. at 513.   
54 Id. at 538-39; id. at 540.   
55 Id. at 541. 
56 297 U.S. 288 (1936).  
57 In that case, the four would have avoided pronouncing on the constitutionality of a 
contract between the TVA and a power company; they would simply have held that the 
plaintiffs, shareholders in the power company, had no standing to sue.  On similar grounds, 
the same four justices would have held in Helvering, that a corporate shareholder had no 
10
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his concurrence in Carter v. Carter Coal Co.,58 an important 1936 case 
in which the Court, by a 5-4 majority, nullified the Guffey Coal Act.59  
The Act imposed a tax on coal processors, 90% of which would be 
credited if the producer came within a code for which the statute 
provided.60  Among the code’s provisions were some prescribing 
conditions, including price, for interstate marketing of coal and others 
prescribing labor conditions in coal production.61  The labor provisions 
were obviously far more vulnerable constitutionally than were the 
marketing conditions, because the prevailing doctrine was still that 
production lay beyond the commerce power.62  Sutherland, for the 
conservative four and Roberts, held the labor provisions 
unconstitutional and then—notwithstanding a severability clause in the 
statute—held that the marketing provisions were inseverable, so that 
the entire statute fell.63  Hughes agreed with the majority’s ultimate 
conclusion with respect to the labor provisions, but he concluded that 
the marketing provisions were constitutional and that they were 
enough to support the entire statute.64  Cardozo’s dissent, joined by the 
other liberals, essentially agreed with the latter part of Hughes’s 
opinion—the marketing provisions were valid and sufficient to support 
the tax—but given those conclusions he saw no reason to address the 
labor provisions at all.65  “The opinion of the Court begins at the wrong 
end,” wrote Cardozo at the end of his opinion.66  “To adopt a homely 
form of words, the complainants have been crying before they are 
really hurt.”67 
 
standing to complain about the Social Security Act’s imposition on the corporation of a tax 
for old-age benefits; the corporation had acquiesced.  Nevertheless, Hughes assigned the 
opinion to Cardozo; his opinion, after summarizing the divide of the Court on the issue, went 
on to uphold the tax on the merits.  Helvering, 301 U.S. at 619. 
58 298 U.S. 238 (1936). 
59 Id. at 238.   
60 Id. at 281.   
61 Id. at 305.   
62 Note, though, that the seeds for overthrow of that doctrine had already been laid, see, e.g., 
Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344, 372 (1933) (Hughes, C.J.: “When 
industry is grievously hurt, when producing concerns fail, when unemployment mounts and 
communities dependent upon profitable production are prostrated, the wells of commerce go 
dry.”), and it would be definitively overthrown the next year in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin 
Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937). 
63 Carter Coal, 298 U.S. at 316.   
64 Id. at 317-24 (Hughes, C.J., concurring in-part).   
65 Id. at 324-41 (Cardozo, J., dissenting).   
66 Id. at 341.   
67 Id. 
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Incrementalism 
In many cases, as one might expect from Cardozo’s 
jurisprudential writings and his Court of Appeals opinions, his 
approach was marked by incremental rather than dramatic changes and 
by soft tests rather than bright-line rules delineating sharp 
categorizations.  As he put it in his Carter Coal dissent, “a great 
principle of constitutional law is not susceptible of comprehensive 
statement[s] in an adjective.”68 
Cardozo’s opinions in two 1935 cases concerning provisions of 
the National Industrial Recovery Act, Panama Refining and Schechter 
Poultry, provide good illustrations.  Panama Refining turned on the 
constitutionality of a provision of the Act that gave the President the 
authority to prohibit transportation in interstate commerce of hot oil—
that is, oil produced or withdrawn in violation of state law.69  Because 
the provision did not contain explicit standards limiting the President’s 
discretion in exercising this authority, Hughes, for the entire Court but 
Cardozo, wrote that if it were upheld,  
it would be idle to pretend that anything would be left 
of limitations upon the power of the Congress to 
delegate its lawmaking function. . . . Instead of 
performing its lawmaking function, the Congress could 
at will and as to such subjects as it chooses transfer that 
function to the President or other officer or to an 
administrative body.70  
To Cardozo, this fear seemed mildly hysterical.  The statutory 
provision did not give the President “any roving commission to inquire 
into evils and then, upon discovering them, do anything he pleases.”71  
On the contrary, the provision authorized the President only to prohibit 
interstate transportation of hot oil, and Cardozo believed that the 
statute’s general statement of policies – preventing unfair competitive 
practices, conserving natural resources, preserving long-term 
productive capacity—was sufficiently definite guidance to satisfy 
68 Carter Coal, 298 U.S. at 327 (Cardozo, J., dissenting). 
69 Pan. Ref., 293 U.S. at 405.   
70 Id. at 430. 
71 Id. at 435 (Cardozo, J., dissenting). 
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constitutional requirements.72  At the same time, ascertainment of the 
facts that would determine how these policies should play out 
was a task too intricate and special to be performed by 
Congress itself through a general enactment in advance 
of the event. All that Congress could safely do was to 
declare the act to be done and the policies to be 
promoted, leaving to the delegate of its power the 
ascertainment of the shifting facts that would determine 
the relation between the doing of the act and the 
attainment of the stated ends.73 
To Cardozo, the question of the validity of delegation, like so many 
others, was one of degree; in this case, he was persuaded that the 
President’s discretion was “not unconfined and vagrant” but rather 
“canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing.”74   
By contrast, in Schechter Poultry, the degree of delegation was 
sufficiently great to persuade him to turn those metaphors around.  The 
entire Court agreed that the delegation of code-making authority to the 
President was unduly broad.75  Cardozo did not concur in Chief Justice 
Hughes’s opinion, but instead wrote separately, joined by Stone.76  The 
delegation, he said, was “as wide as the field of industrial regulation,” 
including “whatever ordinances may be desirable or helpful for the 
well-being or prosperity of the industry affected,” and so allowing “a 
comprehensive body of rules to promote the welfare of the industry, if 
not the welfare of the nation, without reference to standards, ethical or 
commercial, that could be known or predicted in advance of its 
adoption.”77  This, said Cardozo, was “delegation running riot.”78 
And perhaps he, as well as the rest of the Court, was right in 
that conclusion.  But in any event, from the vantage point of eighty 
years, Cardozo’s attitude towards delegation, more receptive than that 
of any of his colleagues, appears to have been sound; without it, the 
modern administrative state would be hard to imagine.
In Schechter Poultry, the Chief Justice went beyond the 
delegation point to hold that the code in question exceeded Congress’s 
72 Id. at 440.   
73 Id. at 437. 
74 Pan. Ref., 293 U.S. at 440. 
75 See generally Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 495. 
76 Id. at 551-55 (Cardozo, J., concurring).   
77 Id. at 553; id. at 552; id. at 553.   
78 Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 553. 
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power under the Commerce Clause.79  And Cardozo agreed.80  But 
Hughes, perhaps to keep the conservative four and Roberts from 
adopting more restrictive language, spoke in categorical terms in 
describing the type of impact on interstate commerce that would justify 
federal regulation; he asserted that “there is a necessary and well-
established distinction between direct and indirect effects.”81  Cardozo 
also used the word “direct,” but he folded it into a discussion making 
clear that in his view this was far from a binary matter.82  “The law is 
not indifferent to considerations of degree,” he wrote.83  “Activities 
local in their immediacy do not become interstate and national because 
of distant repercussions.  What is near and what is distant may at times 
be uncertain.”84  In the case before him, though, he declared, “There is 
no penumbra of uncertainty obscuring judgment here.  To find 
immediacy or directness here is to find it almost everywhere.”85  The 
non-categorical approach espoused by Cardozo soon came to dominate 
the Court’s treatment of the commerce power.86  
In the context of individual liberties as well, Cardozo made 
clear his preference for a non-categorical approach.  He coined the 
term “tyranny of labels,”87 and cautioned that it “must not lead us to 
leap to a conclusion that a word which in one set of facts may stand for 
79 See id. at 551-55.   
80 Id.  
81 Id. at 546.  Hughes also spoke in less categorical terms.  Drawing on a leading opinion 
of his from his prior tenure on the Court, he said that 
the dominant authority of Congress necessarily embraces the right to 
control [common carriers’] intrastate operations in all matters having such 
a close and substantial relation to interstate traffic that the control is 
essential or appropriate to secure the freedom of that traffic from 
interference or unjust discrimination and to promote the efficiency of the 
interstate service. 
Id. at 544. 
82 Schechter Poultry, 295 U.S. at 552 (Cardozo, J., dissenting).   
83 Id. at 554.   
84 Id.  
85 Id. 
86 In Jones & Laughlin, Hughes, for a 5-4 majority, wrote: “Although activities may be 
intrastate in character when separately considered, if they have such a close and substantial 
relation to interstate commerce that their control is essential or appropriate to protect that 
commerce from burdens and obstructions, Congress cannot be denied the power to exercise 
that control.”  301 U.S. at 37.  For support, he cited Schechter Poultry, which had used similar 
language—but he did not repeat the direct-indirect dichotomy, which Schechter Poultry had 
also articulated.  295 U.S. at 547. 
87 Snyder v. Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 114 (1934). 
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oppression or enormity is of like effect in every other.”88  And so in 
Palko v. Connecticut, handed down shortly before his health failed, he 
articulated an approach to the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment that did not depend on incorporating against the states the 
protections of the Bill of Rights in their entirety; instead, he believed 
the Court must measure “the particular situation laid before [it]” in a 
given case against a general standard measuring whether the right 
asserted in that context was “of the very essence of a scheme of ordered 
liberty.”89 
Cardozo’s incrementalist approach reflected both a normative 
view of how decisions should be shaped and a historical view of how 
law changes over time.  This combination played out with force and 
clarity in a concurrence that Cardozo drafted in Blaisdell, in which the 
Court, by a 5-4 vote, upheld a mortgage moratorium law enacted by 
Minnesota.90  To the four conservatives, the law was a blatant violation 
of Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution, which forbids states to 
impair the obligation of contracts; Justice Sutherland marshalled the 
argument in a powerful dissent arguing that this type of debtor-
protection law, enacted in desperate economic times, was precisely the 
type that the framers had meant to prohibit.91  Unsatisfied by Hughes’s 
draft opinion for the majority, Cardozo constructed an argument that 
recognized the categorical way in which the Contracts Clause had been 
interpreted in the past but that treated the adoption of the Fourteenth 
Amendment as mitigating the hard edge of that Clause: the 
Amendment created “a profound change in the relation between the 
federal government and the governments of the states,” subjecting the 
latter to “the rule of reason” and so eliminating the “dilemma of ‘all or 
nothing.’”92  Thus, over time “a process of evolution” had occurred, by 
which courts, recognizing the interconnection of “the welfare of the 
social organism in any of its parts” and “the welfare of the whole,” felt 
their way “toward a rational compromise between private rights and 
public welfare.”93  This meant that the words of the Contracts Clause 
88 Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 323 (1937). 
89 Id. at 327; id. at 325; see also id. at 328 (“We deal with the statute before us and no 
other.”); KAUFMAN, supra note 2, at 553 (“Th[e] notion that incorporation of the Bill of Rights 
should be handled on a case-by-case, issue-by-issue basis was very congenial to Cardozo’s 
incremental common law approach to decision-making.”). 
90 See generally Blaisdell, 290 U.S. at 398.  
91 Id. at 448-83 (Sutherland, J., dissenting). 
92 BREST ET AL., supra note 35. 
93 BREST ET AL., supra note 35, at 572. 
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were no longer given “their literal and stark significance,” but more 
general “limits of fairness, of moderation, and of pressing and 
emergent need” would still constrain the states.94 
Cardozo withdrew the concurrence when Hughes—who found 
the thinking congenial—incorporated much of its substance into his 
majority opinion.  But the draft remains a powerful statement of the 
nature and cause of changing constitutional interpretation.  I do not 
mean to suggest that categorical rules, and for that matter non-
continuous transformation, have no proper role in constitutional law; 
surely they do.  But the process that Cardozo outlined describes much 
of how constitutional law develops, and of why it is capable of 
development along the lines of the common law. 
CONCLUSION 
Some observers regard Cardozo’s years on the Supreme Court 
as paling besides his tenure on the New York Court of Appeals.95  It is 
true that as junior justice Cardozo did not have comparable 
opportunities to speak for the Court in important cases.  But he sat on 
the Supreme Court at a crucial time in history, and his performance 
was outstanding.  He exercised more influence than one might expect 
for the junior justice.  His pen still glittered.  His views have stood up 
well as the decades have passed.  And his firm grasp of the nature of 
law and of legal change gave his opinions special force.  In all but 
length of years, Cardozo’s tenure easily met the high expectations that 
so many Americans expressed when, practically by acclamation, the 
President nominated him to the Supreme Court. 
94 BREST ET AL., supra note 35, at 572. 
95 See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, CARDOZO: A STUDY IN REPUTATION 121-22 (1990). 
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